Abstract. In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20] .
Introduction
In their seminal papers [3] and [19] , Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie considered an economic model consisting of finitely many agents. Since only finitely many coalitions can be formed in such an economy, the characterization of Walrasian allocations by the veto mechanism is asymptotic [7] . Later, Aumann [4] considered an economic model consisting of a continuum of agents by taking [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure as the space of agents and established a characterization of Walrasian allocations in terms of the core. The main advantage of Aumann's model is that perfect competition prevails, that is, the influence of any individual agent on the economy is negligible. However, the competition in many real economies is imperfect, for instance, in an economy which has some individual agents who own large portions of initial endowments of some commodities. This is the main motivation to consider mixed economies or oligopolistic markets, refer to [8] , [12] , [20] , and [24] . In Chapter 7 of [6] , uncertainty was introduced in the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model by allowing finitely many states of nature and viewing the commodities as differentiated by state. In this model, each agent possesses the same full information and makes a contract contingent on the realized state of nature. However, such a model does not capture the idea of contracts under asymmetric information. This analysis was extended by Radner in [21] , where each agent is characterized by a private information set, a state-dependent utility function, a random initial endowment and a prior belief. The trade of an agent is measurable with respect to his information so that he cannot act differently on states that he cannot distinguish and an agent makes a contract for trading commodities before he obtains any information about JEL classification: C71; D41; D43; D51; D82. Keywords. Asymmetric information; Exactly feasible; Ex-post core; mixed economy; N Y -fine core; N Y -private core; Robustly efficient allocation; N Y -strong fine core; RW -fine core; Walrasian expectations allocation.
the realized state of nature. Radner also extended the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model to that of a Walrasian expectations equilibrium in his model so that better informed agents are generally better off.
In this paper, we consider a mixed economy with asymmetric information and infinitely many commodities. In Section 2, we provide a general description on our model. Section 3 is devoted to study a special case of our model, where the space of agents is an atomless measure space. Two results on the private blocking power of a coalition are established, and measures of blocking coalitions when agents are asymmetrically informed are studied. Schmeidler [23] first improved Aumann's equivalence result by only considering the blocking power of small coalitions in a complete information and atomless economy with finitely many commodities. Schmeidler's result was further generalized in Grodal [13] . Finally, Vind [26] showed that if some coalition blocks an allocation then there is a blocking coalition with any measure less than the measure of the grand coalition. Although Hervés-Beloso et al. [14] pointed out that analogous results of Vind's theorem are generally false for an atomless economy with the space of real bounded sequences as the commodity space, extensions of Vind's theorem for special economies with asymmetric information and the free disposal condition can be found in [5] , [15] and [16] . Recently, Hervés-Beloso et al. [18] established a Vind's type theorem for the process of information shared by coalitions in an asymmetric information economy having a finite dimensional commodity space and the free disposal assumption. Considering an ordered Banach space whose positive cone admitting an interior point as the commodity space and a complete finite positive atomless measure space of agents, Evren and Hüsseinov [11] established a Vind's type result on the private core of an economy under the free disposal condition and other additional assumptions. However, as mentioned in [20] , whether there is a version of Vind's theorem on the private core of an economy with the exact feasibility for finite dimensional economies is still an open problem. Here, we investigate this question for an asymmetric information economy with an ordered Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point as the commodity space and give a full solution. As a result, the equivalence theorem for finite dimensional economies in [2] is further generalized. The corresponding problems on the (strong) fine core of an economy are also considered.
Concerning a complete information economy, Hervés-Beloso and Mareno-García [17] provided a characterization of Walrasian allocations by robustly efficient allocations when the economy has a continuum of agents and finitely many commodities. More precisely, if f is a Walrasian allocation then it is non-dominated in not only the initial economy but also all economies obtained by modifying the initial endowments of any coalition in the direction of f . In the same paper, they also showed that such a result holds for economies with asymmetric information and the space of real bounded sequences as the commodity space. In Section 4, a similar result is established in an asymmetric information economy whose space of agents is a complete finite positive measure space and commodity space is an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point. Other results in Section 4 concern the relationships among different types of cores. Einy et al. [9] showed that the fine core is a subset of the ex-post core for an asymmetric information economy with an atomless measure space of agents and a finite dimensional commodity space. One year later, they established a characterization of the weak fine core by the private core in a complete information economy in [10] , where it was assumed that the grand coalition is a finite union of pairwise disjoint measurable subsets having positive measure and any two agents in the same measurable subset have the same information. Here, these results are extend to mixed economies with asymmetric information and ordered separable Banach spaces whose positive cones contain interior points as commodity spaces. Furthermore, in our framework there may exist an information type associated with a null measurable subset of the grand coalition.
The model
Let E be an exchange economy with asymmetric information as in [21] and [22] . Suppose that (Ω, F ) is a measurable space, where Ω is a finite set denoting all possible states of nature and the σ-algebra F denotes all events. Following from the well-known mixed market model, the space of agents is a measure space (T, Σ, µ) with a complete, finite and positive measure µ, where T is the set of agents, Σ is the σ-algebra of measurable subsets of T whose economic weights on the market are given by µ. Following from a classical result in measure theory, T can be decomposed into two parts: one is atomelss and the other contains countably many atoms. That is, T = T 0 ∪ T 1 , where T 0 is the atomless part and T 1 is the countable union of µ-atoms. Since each µ-atom is treated as an agent, A ∈ T 1 is used instead of A ⊆ T 1 if A is a µ-atom. Agents in T 0 are called "small agents" and those in T 1 are called "large agents". In each state, infinitely many commodities are assumed. Throughout, the commodity space of E is an ordered Banach space Y whose positive cone has an interior point. The order on Y is denoted by ≤, and Y + = {x ∈ Y : x ≥ 0} denotes the positive cone of Y . The symbol x ≫ 0 (resp. x > 0) denotes a strictly positive (resp. non-zero positive) element x of Y + . The economy extends over two time periods τ = 0, 1. Consumption takes place at τ = 1. At τ = 0, there is uncertainty over the states and agents make contracts that are contingent on the realized state at τ = 1. Thus, E can be defined by
Here, Y + is the consumption set in every state ω ∈ Ω for every agent t ∈ T ; F t the σ-algebra generated by a partition Π t of Ω representing the private information of agent t; U t : Ω × Y + → R is the state-dependent utility function of agent t; a(t, ·) : Ω → Y + is the random initial endowment of agent t, assumed to be constant on elements of Π t ; and q t is a probability measure on Ω giving the prior of agent t. It is assumed that q t is positive on all elements of Ω. The quadruple (F t , U t , a(t, ·), q t ) is called the characteristics of the agent t ∈ T . A function x : Ω → Y + is interpreted as a random consumption bundle in E. The ex ante expected utility of an agent t for a given random consumption bundle x is defined by V t (x) = ω∈Ω U t (ω, x)q t (ω).
Any set S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0 is called a coalition of E. If S and S ′ are two coalitions of E with S ′ ⊆ S, then S ′ is called a sub-coalition of S. For a coalition S in E, an S-assignment in E is a function f :
Ω : x is F t -measurable}. An S-assignment f in E is called an S-allocation if f (t, ·) ∈ L t for almost all t ∈ S, and it is said to be S-feasible if S f (·, ω)dµ ≤ S a(·, ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω. T -assignments, T -allocations and T -feasible allocations are simply called assignments, allocations and feasible allocations. A coalition S privately blocks an allocation f in E if there is an S-feasible allocation g such that V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S. The private core of E is the set of all feasible allocations which are not privately blocked by any coalition. A price system is an F -measurable, non-zero function π : Ω → Y * + , where Y * + is the positive cone of the norm-dual space Y * of Y . The budget set of agent t can be defined by
A Walrasian expectations equilibrium of E in the sense of Radner is a pair (f, π), where f is a feasible allocation and π is a price system such that for almost all t ∈ T , f (t, ·) ∈ B t (π) and f (t, ·) maximizes V t on B t (π), and
Two agents are said to be the same type if they have the same characteristics.
The family of partitions of Ω is denoted by P. For any Q ∈ P, let T Q = {t ∈ T : Π t = Q}. For any coalition S, put P S = {Q ∈ P : S ∩ T Q = ∅} and
only if t, t ′ ∈ T Q for some Q ∈ P T . For any S ∈ Σ, Q denotes the σ-algebra generated by the smallest refinement of all members of Q ⊆ P S .
Assumptions:
(A 1 ) Measurability: The functions t → q t and t → F t are measurable. This means that {t ∈ T : q t ∈ A} ∈ Σ for any Borel subset A of |Ω| − 1 dimensional unit simplex, and T Q ∈ Σ for all Q ∈ P. 
), V t is monotone (resp. strongly monotone) in the sense that if x, y ∈ (Y + ) Ω with y(ω) ≫ 0 (resp. y(ω) > 0) for some ω ∈ Ω, then V t (x + y) > V t (x). Clearly, (A 4 ) implies that V t0 is partially concave for all t 0 ∈ T 1 , that is,
)dµ for all t 0 ∈ T 1 and S-feasible assignment f in E with µ(S ∩ T 1 ) > 0, wheref is defined in (A 4 ). Similarly, (A ′ 4 ) implies that V t is concave for all t ∈ T . By (A 6 ), all agents in T 1 have the same characteristics, so we use (F T1 , U T1 , a(T 1 , ·), q T1 ) to denote their common characteristics. Similarly, V T1 denotes the common ex ante expected utility of agents in T 1 . Note that (A 8 ) is similar to (A.4) in [9] , and (A 1 )-(A 3 ), (A 5 ) are the same as those in [11] . For undefined mathematical concepts and terminologies in this paper, refer to [1] .
Privately blocking and exact feasibility in atomless economies
In this section, we study privately blocking and exactly feasible allocations in an atomless economy. Thus, we assume T = T 0 in this section. Two lemmas are established in Subsection 3.1, which are used in Section 4. Similar to that in [26] , we also investigate the blocking power of a coalition for the (strong) fine core and the private core when the exact feasibility is imposed on allocations.
3.1. Privately blocking coalitions. The following result is similar to Lemma 1 in [11] . In order to obtain a slightly different conclusion, we provide a proof here.
Lemma 3.1. Let an allocation f in E be privately blocked by a coalition S and α ∈ (0, 1). Under (A 1 ), (A 2 ) and (A 5 ), there exist an S-allocation g and a subcoalition S ′ of S such that
Proof. Since f is privately blocked by the coalition S, there exists an S-feasible
Then h(t, ·) ∈ P f (t) for almost all t ∈ S. By ignoring a µ-null subset of S, one can choose a separable, closed linear subspace
, where Σ S = {A ∈ Σ : A ⊆ S}, Gr P f denotes the graph of P f and B(Z) is the family of Borel subsets of Z. For any ǫ > 0, define a correspondence
which is the projection of the set
on S. By the projection theorem [1, p.608], the set {t ∈ S : ǫ t < β} ∈ Σ, which means that the function t → ǫ t is measurable. Choose a sequence
which is equivalent to
where
, by absolute continuity of the Bochner integral,
which contradicts with the choice of S m . This verifies the claim. By (3.1) and the claim, we conclude that µ(S m ∩ T Q ) > αµ(S ∩ T Q ) for all Q ∈ P(S). The proof is completed by letting g = g m and S ′ = S m .
Remark 3.2. The conclusion of Lemma 3.1 is also true if the atomless measure space is replaced by a complete finite positive measure space.
Lemma 3.3. [25] Suppose that (X, Σ, µ) is an atomless measure space and E is a
The following result is an extension of the result used in the main theorem of [26] to an asymmetric information economy whose commodity space is an ordered Banach space having an interior point in its positive cone.
Lemma 3.4. Let f be an allocation in E. Suppose there exist a coalition S, a subcoalition S ′ of S and an S-allocation g such that g(t, ω) ≫ 0 for all (t, ω) ∈ S ′ × Ω,
Pick an r ∈ (0, 1) and a Q ∈ P(S). Let {c m } be a sequence in (0, 1) such that c m → 0 as m → ∞. Applying an argument similar to that in Lemma 3.1, it can be shown that there is an increasing sequence {S
be an open neighborhood of 0 such that rx Q − U (r, Q) ⊆ intY + . By Lemma 3.3,
Furthermore, for all ω ∈ Ω,
Consequently, we obtain
We now define a Q-measurable d
It can be readily checked that h is the desired S-allocation.
3.2.
Allocations with the exact feasibility. In this subsection, we provide a characterization of exactly feasible allocations of E that are not in various types of cores. Given a coalition S of E, an S-assignment f in E is called S-exactly feasible if S f (·, ω)dµ = S a(·, ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω. For simplicity, T -exactly feasible assignment is just termed as exactly feasible assignment. An allocation f in E is NY-strongly fine 1 blocked by a coalition S [28] if there exist a sub-coalition S 0 and an S-exactly feasible assignment g such that g(t, ·) is P S -measurable and V t (g(t, ·)) ≥ V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S, and V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S 0 . The NY-strong fine core [28] of E is the set of exactly feasible allocations which are not N Y -strongly fine blocked by any coalition of E.
Proof. Since f is N Y -strongly fine blocked by S, there are a sub-coalition S 0 of S and an S-exactly feasible assignment y such that y(t, ·) is P S -measurable and V t (y(t, ·)) ≥ V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S, and V t (y(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S 0 . Without loss of generality, we may assume that µ(S 0 ) < µ(S). Otherwise, the argument will be similar to that in Lemma 3.1. By (A ′ 3 ) and the fact that 1 NY is the abbreviation of Nicholas Yannelis. Here, we follow some idea of his definition in [28] , to distinguish it from the concept of Wilson in [27] .
V t (y(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S 0 , there exist an atom A of P S and a sub-coalition S 1 of S 0 such that y(t, ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ A and almost all t ∈ S 1 . Let {c m } be a sequence in (0, 1) converging to 0. For each m ≥ 1, we define a function y m :
is P S -measurable for almost all t ∈ S 1 . By an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3.1, it can be shown that there is a sub-coalition S m of S 1 such that V t (y m (t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S m . Note that the function
otherwise.
Furthermore define another function h :
Then,ŷ(t, ·) is P S -measurable and by (A
Clearly, h m (t, ·) is P S -measurable for almost all t ∈ S, and h m (t, ω) ≫ 0 for all (t, ω) ∈ S × Ω. Applying an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3.1, one can find an increasing sequence {R m } ⊆ Σ S such that m R m ∼ S and V t (h m (t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ R m . Finally, for each m ≥ 1, consider the function g m :
Following from the steps at the end of the proof of Lemma 3.1, it can be verified that the conclusion of this lemma is true when m is sufficiently large. Hence, the proof is completed by selecting such an m and setting S ′ = R m and g = g m . 
Then z(ω) ≫ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. For any fixed Q ∈ P(S), by Lemma 3.3,
is convex. For any given δ ∈ (0, 1), there is a sequence {E
for all ω ∈ Ω, where z Q (ω) = S∩TQ (a(·, ω) − g(·, ω))dµ. Since µ is atomless, we can select a sequence {F
, f is N Y -strongly fine blocked by F n0 viaĝ, which proves the theorem for ǫ ≤ µ(S). If µ(S) = µ(T ), the proof has been completed. Otherwise, µ(T \ S) > 0. Let R = T \ S. Again by Lemma 3.3,
is convex for all Q ∈ P(R). Given any α ∈ (0, 1) and Q ∈ P(R), applying an argument similar to the previous one, one can find a sequence {B
Then b n is P Bn -measurable for all n ≥ 1, and b n (ω) → 0 as n → ∞ for all ω ∈ Ω. Choose an n 1 satisfying αz(ω) − b n1 (ω) ≫ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, define
and take S = S ∪ B n1 . Note that µ( S) = µ(S) + (1 − α)µ(T \ S) and g α is P Smeasurable for almost all t ∈ S. By (A 
Then y α (t, ·) is P S -measurable and V t (y α (t, ·)) ≥ V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S, and V t (y α (t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S. Using (3.2) and (3.3), one has
for all ω ∈ Ω. This completes the proof.
An allocation f in E is NY-fine blocked by a coalition S [28] if there is an Sexactly feasible assignment g such that g(t, ·) is P S -measurable and V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S. The NY-fine core [28] of E is the set of exactly feasible allocations which are not N Y -fine blocked by any coalition of E.
) and (A 5 ), an analogous result can be derived for allocations not in the N Y -fine core of E by modifying the functions g α and y ǫ in the following way:
and
Definition 3.8. An allocation f in E is NY-privately blocked by a coalition S [28] if there exists an S-exactly feasible allocation g such that V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S. The NY-private core [28] of E is the set of exactly feasible allocations which are not N Y -privately blocked by any coalition of E. Proof. Since f is not in the N Y -private core of E, there exist a coalition S and an S-exactly feasible allocation g such that V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S. For all ω ∈ Ω and Q ∈ P(S), let
Choose an e ≫ 0 such that e ≤ eQ(ω) 3
for all ω ∈ Ω and Q ∈ P(S), an open ball U with center 0 and radius ǫ > 0 such that e − U ⊆ intY + and a λ ∈ (0, 1). Let {c m } be a sequence in (0, 1) such that c m → 0 as m → ∞. Pick an arbitrary element Q ∈ P(S), and define a function g
. By an argument similar to that in Lemma 3.1, one can find an increasing sequence {S , ·) ) for almost all t ∈ S Q m . By absolute continuity of the Bochner integral, there is some δ > 0 such that
for all R Q ∈ Σ S∩TQ with µ(R Q ) < δ and Q ∈ P(S). For each Q ∈ P(S), choose an m Q such that
for all Q ∈ P(S). For each Q ∈ P(S) and (t, ω) ∈ S Q m0 × Ω, set
Consider a function y
Since
for all ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma 3.3, the set
is convex. Using an argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 3.6, one can find a sequence {F
is Q-measurable for all n ≥ 1 and b
By (A 3 ) and the fact that
Then h is an F -allocation and V t (h(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ F . By (3.4)-(3.6), we have F (h(·, ω) − a(·, ω))dµ = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, f is N Y -privately blocked by F via h. This proves the theorem for ǫ ≤ µ(S). If µ(S) = µ(T ), the proof has been completed. Otherwise,
. Again pick an arbitrary element Q ∈ P(A). By Lemma 3.3,
is convex. Hence, there exists a sequence {B
,
kQ × Ω, and for any Q ∈ P(S), consider the functionŷ , ·) ) for almost all t ∈ S, and further h λ is an S-allocation. Let S = S ∪ B. Since µ( S) = µ(S) + (1 − λ)µ(T \ S), it remains to verify that f is N Y -privately blocked by S. To show this, consider g λ :
Obviously, g λ is an S-allocation and V t (g λ (t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S. Furthermore, using (3.7)-(3.9), it can be simply verified that
holds for all ω ∈ Ω. This completes the proof. ) the conclusions of Theorem 3.6, Remark 3.7 and Theorem 3.9 hold. Indeed, to restore the conclusions in Theorem 3.6 and Remark 3.7, note that S gdµ, S f dµ are in the convex set cl S P f dµ. So, S (αg + (1 − α)f )dµ ∈ cl S P f dµ and by (A ′ 3 ), g α dµ ∈ S P f dµ. Similarly, to restore the conclusion of Theorem 3.9, note that S g Q m0 dµ and S f dµ are elements of the convex set cl S P f dµ. Thus, S (λg
Robust efficiency and different types of cores of mixed market economies
In this section, we study cores and Walrasian expectations allocations in mixed economies. We characterize Walrasian expectations allocations in terms of robust efficiency, and establish relationships among various types of cores. To achieve these goals, we associate the mixed economy E in Section 2 with an atomless economy E * , and then apply results established in Section 3. The space of agents of E * is denoted by (T * , Σ * , µ * ), where T * = T 0 ∪ T * 1 and T * 1 is an atomless measure space such that µ * (T * 1 ) = µ(T 1 ) and T 0 ∩ T * 1 = ∅. We assume that (T * , Σ * , µ * ) is obtained by the direct sum of (T 0 , Σ T0 , µ T0 ) and the measure space T * 1 , where µ T0 is the restriction of µ to T 0 . It is also assumed that each agent A ∈ T 1 one-to-one corresponds to a measurable subset A * of T * 1 with µ * (A * ) = µ(A). Each agent t ∈ A * is characterized by the private information set F t = F A ; the consumption set Y + in each state ω ∈ Ω; the initial endowment a(t, ·) = a(A, ·); the utility function U t = U A ; and the prior q t = q A . Therefore, the ex ante expected utility function of every agent t ∈ A * is V t = V A .
4.1. Robust efficiency. In this subsection, we characterize a Walrasian expectations equilibrium of a mixed economy by the private blocking power of the grand coalition. For any coalition S, allocation f in E and any 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, we introduce an asymmetric information economy E(S, f, r) which coincides with E except for the initial endowment allocation that is given by
A feasible allocation f in E is said to be robustly efficient [17] if f is not privately blocked by the grand coalition in every economy E(S, f, r).
Lemma 4.1. Assume that an allocation f * in E * is privately blocked by a coalition S * with µ
Proof. If ǫ = µ * (S * ∩ T * 1 ), the conclusion directly follows from Lemma 3.1. Assume 0 < ǫ < µ * (S * ∩ T * 1 ). Let δ = ǫ µ * (S * ∩T * 1 ) and α = 1 − δ 2 . Applying Lemma 3.1, one has a sub-coalition S * 1 of S * and an S * -allocation g * satisfying (i)-(iii) of Lemma 3.1. For each Q ∈ P(S * ), by Lemma 3.3, the set
is convex. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.6, for each Q ∈ P(S * ), there exists a sequence {E
Pick an n 0 such that En 0 (a − g * )dµ * ≫ 0, and put
Lemma 4.2.
[11] Assume Y is separable. Under (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ), f * is a Walrasian expectations allocation of E * if and only if it is in the private core of E * .
Lemma 4.3. [11]
Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ). Let f * be a feasible allocation of E * and 0 < ǫ < µ * (T * ). If f * is not in the private core of E * , then there is a coalition S with µ * (S) = ǫ privately blocking f * .
The following lemma is similar to Theorem 3.5 in [8] .
Lemma 4.4. Assume that f is a robustly efficient allocation of E.
, there is an allocationf in E such thatf , ·) ) for all t ∈ T and T f dµ = Tf dµ.
Proof. Consider the allocationf :
To complete the proof, one only needs to verify
Then applying an argument similar to that in Lemma 3.1, one can find some r 1 ∈ (0, 1) and a sub-coalition
µ(T1) and r 3 = r 1 + η for some η > 0 such that r 3 ∈ (0, 1). Then r 2 ∈ (0, 1]. Suppose that for each ω ∈ Ω,
Note that α(ω) ∈ −intY + for each ω ∈ Ω. Choose an ǫ > 0 such that for each ω ∈ Ω, α(ω) + B(0, 2ǫ) ⊆ −intY + . By Lemma 3.3, H = cl E (f − a) ∈ Y Ω : E ∈ Σ T0 is convex. So there is an E 0 ∈ Σ T0 such that E0 (f − a) − r 2 r 3 T0 (f − a) < ǫ. Pick an u ∈ B(0, ǫ) ∩ intY + and put S = E 0 ∪ C. Then, µ(S) < µ(T ). Note that the function g :
Then it can be easily verified that for all ω ∈ Ω,
It follows that S g(·, ω)dµ − S a(·, ω)dµ ≪ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Select an z ≫ 0 such that S a(·, ω)dµ − S g(·, ω)dµ ≫ z for each ω ∈ Ω and pick an r ∈ (0, 1) such that r 1f (t, ω) ≤ rg(t, ω) for all (t, ω) ∈ C × Ω. Note that the function h 1 : C × Ω → Y + , defined by h 1 (t, ω) = r 1f (t, ω), is a C-allocation and V T1 (h 1 (t, ·)) > V T1 (f (t, ·)) for all t ∈ C. By Lemma 3.4, there is an E 0 -allocation , ·) ) for almost all t ∈ E 0 , and
is an S-allocation, V t (h(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S, and
Define a function y :
for almost all t ∈ T \ S. Thus, y is an allocation and V t (y(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ T . Furthermore, using (4.1) and
This means that f is privately blocked by the grand coalition in E(T \S, f, r), which contradicts with the fact that f is robustly efficient. So
which is a contradiction. Thus,
Next, in answering a question mentioned Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García in [17, p.705 ], we provide a characterization of Walrasian expectations equilibria by the veto power of the grand coalition in a mixed economy with asymmetric information and an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point as the commodity space. Proof. Suppose that f is a Walrasian expectations allocation of E. Applying an argument similar to that in [17] , one can show that it is robustly efficient.
Conversely, let f be a robustly efficient allocation of E. By Lemma 4.4, there is an allocationf in E such thatf , ·) ) for all t ∈ T 1 and T f dµ = Tf dµ. Suppose that f is not a Walrasian expectations allocation of E. Thenf is not a Walrasian expectations allocation for E. To see this, let (f , π) be a Walrasian expectations equilibrium for E, d ∈ intY + and α > 0. By (A 3 ), one has V t (f (t, ·) + αd) > V t (f (t, ·)) = V t (f (t, ·)) for all t ∈ T . It follows that for almost all t ∈ T ,
coalition S of E(S, f, r) in Theorem 4.5 can be chosen arbitrarily small in an atomless economy. Thus, perturbation of small coalition is enough to characterize the Walrasian expectations allocations.
4.2.
The RW -fine core and the ex-post core. In this subsection, we establish a relationship between the RW -fine core and the ex-post core of E. An information structure for a coalition S is a family {G t : t ∈ S} of σ-algebras such that G t ⊆ F for all t ∈ S and {t ∈ S : G t = H} ∈ Σ for every σ-algebra H ⊆ F . Since Ω is finite, the family {G ⊆ F : G is a σ-algebra} is finite. Thus, it is possible that for an information structure {G t : t ∈ S} of S and two distinct agents t and t ′ of S, G t = G t ′ . A communication system for a coalition S is an information structure {G t : t ∈ S} for S such that F t ⊆ G t ⊆ P S for almost all t ∈ S, and it is called a full communication system if G t = P S for almost all t ∈ S. Further, for any σ-algebra H with H ⊆ F , F -measurable function f : Ω → Y + and t ∈ T , let E t [f |H] be the conditional expectation of f given H with respect to q t . For any coalition S, we now assume that an S-allocation (including initial endowment) is a function f :
is F -measurable for almost all t ∈ S. As mentioned previously, T -allocations are simply called allocations.
Definition 4.7.
[27] An allocation f in E is RW-fine 2 blocked by a coalition S if there are an S-allocation g, a communication system {G t } t∈S for S, and a nonempty event A ∈ t∈S G t such that S g(·, ω)dµ = S a(·, ω)dµ for all ω ∈ A, and
for all ω ∈ A and almost all t ∈ S. The RW-fine core of E is the set of all feasible allocations that cannot be RW -fine blocked by any coalition.
Definition 4.8. [9] An allocation f in E is ex-postly blocked by a coalition S if there exist an S-allocation g and a state ω 0 ∈ Ω such that S g(·, ω 0 )dµ = S a(·, ω 0 )dµ, and U t (ω 0 , g(t, ω 0 )) > U t (ω 0 , f (t, ω 0 )) for almost all t ∈ S. The ex-post core of E is the set of all feasible allocations that cannot be ex-postly blocked by any coalition. Lemma 4.9. Assume that f is in the RW -fine core of E. Under (A 1 )-(A 9 ), there exists an allocationf in E such thatf
One needs to verify U T1 (ω,f (t, ω)) = U T1 (ω, f (t, ω)) for all (t, ω) ∈ T 1 ×Ω. Suppose that there exist a coalition D ⊆ T 1 and a state ω 0 ∈ Ω such that U T1 (ω 0 ,f (t, ω 0 )) > U T1 (ω 0 , f (t, ω 0 )) for all t ∈ D. Then, a contradiction can be derived by a proof similar to that of Lemma 4.4 except for the fact that the coalition E 0 can be chosen as Q∈P(T0) E Q 0 , where each E Q 0 satisfies the condition
the blocking coalition is of the form R = S T 0 \ Q∈P(T0) T Q , where S is defined in Lemma 4.4, and the function g : R → Y + is defined by
Note that
Then, y is an R-allocation. Since a(t, ·) is F -measurable, a(t, ω) = a(t, ω ′ ) for almost all t ∈ R and all ω, ω y(t, ·) ). Further, for all ω ∈ A(ω 0 ) and almost all t ∈ R, one has that
which implies that f is RW -fine blocked by R via y. This contradicts with the assumption. Hence, U T1 (ω, f (t, ω)) ≥ U T1 (ω,f (t, ω)) for all (t, ω) ∈ T 1 × Ω. By an argument similar to that in Lemma 4.4, one can further show
The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 3.1 in [9] to mixed economies with infinitely many commodities and the exact feasibility. In addition, the assumption P T = P(T ) used by Einy et al. is not assumed in our result. To this end, we assume that for each ω ∈ Ω, E(ω) denotes the symmetric information economy whose space of agents are T , and whose the consumption set, the utility function and the initial endowment of agent t are Y + , U t (ω, ·) and a(t, ω) respectively. Theorem 4.10. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 9 ). If f is in the RW -fine core of E, then it is also in the ex-post core of E.
Proof. Suppose that f is not in the ex-post core of E. The allocationf defined in Lemma 4.9 is not in the ex-post core of E either. Then there is a state ω 0 ∈ Ω such thatf (·, ω 0 ) is a feasible allocation in the symmetric information economy E(ω 0 ) and is not in the core of E(ω 0 ). Consider an allocationf * :
is not in the core of E * (ω 0 ). Choose an arbitrary A 0 ∈ T 1 and let µ(A 0 ) = ǫ > 0. Note that under (A 3 ), the conclusion of Lemma 4.3 also holds with the exact feasibility in a deterministic economy. Thus, f * (·, ω 0 ) is blocked by a coalition S * viaĝ * such that µ * (S * ) = µ * (T 0 ) + ǫ, if µ * (T * 1 \ A * 0 ) < min{µ * (T 0 ∩ T * Q ) : Q ∈ P(T 0 )}, and otherwise, µ * (S * ) > µ * (T 0 )−min{µ * (T 0 ∩T * Q ) : Q ∈ P(T 0 )}+ µ * (T * 1 ). Clearly, µ * (S * ∩T * 1 ) ≥ ǫ and P(S * ) = P(T ). Let α = ǫ µ * (S * ∩T * 1 ) . Applying (A 3 ) and an argument similar to that in Lemma 4.1, one can show that there exists a coalition R * ⊆ Q∈P(T * ) (S * ∩ T * Q ) blockingf * (·, ω 0 ) viaĥ * : R * → Y + in E * (ω 0 ) such that µ * (R * ∩ T * Q ) = αµ * (S * ∩ T * Q ) for all Q ∈ P(S * ) and µ * (R * ∩ T * 1 ) = ǫ. Note that P(R * ) = P(S * ). Consider a coalition R of E define by R = (R * ∩ T 0 ) ∪ A 0 . Then, P(R) = P(T ). We consider a functionĥ : R → Y + defined bŷ h(t) =   ĥ * (t), if t ∈ R * ∩ T 0 ; 1 ǫ R * ∩T * 1ĥ * dµ * , otherwise.
Obviously, U t (ω 0 ,ĥ(t)) > U t (ω 0 ,f (t, ω 0 )) if t ∈ R * ∩ T 0 . By (A 4 ), U T1 (ω 0 ,ĥ(t)) > U T1 (ω 0 ,f (t, ω 0 )) if t = A 0 . Moreover, Rĥ dµ = R a(·, ω 0 )dµ. Define a coalition E = R ∪ T 0 \ Q∈P(T0) T Q . Then P T = P E . Let A(ω 0 ) be the atom of P T containing ω 0 . Now, define a function y : E × Ω → Y + such that y(t, ω) = ĥ (t), if (t, ω) ∈ R × A(ω 0 ); a(t, ω), otherwise.
Then, y is an E-allocation. Applying an argument similar to that in Lemma 4.9, one can show that f is RW -fine blocked by E via y. This contradicts with the assumption, which completes the proof. 
4.3.
The weak fine core. In this subsection, we extend Proposition 5.1 in [10] to mixed economies with infinitely many commodities and the exact feasibility. We also relax the assumption P T = P(T ).
Definition 4.12. A feasible assignment f in E is said to be in the weak fine core of E if f (t, ·) is P T -measurable for almost all t ∈ T , and f cannot be N Y -fine blocked by any coalition.
In the sequel, the economy E s is similar to E except for the information of every agent being P T . The proof of the next lemma is similar to that of Lemma 4.9.
Lemma 4.13. Assume that f is in the weak fine core of E. Under (A 1 )-(A 7 ), there exists an allocationf such thatf | T0×Ω = f ,f (·, ω) is constant on T 1 for each ω ∈ Ω, V T1 (f (t, ·)) = V T1 (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ T 1 and T f dµ = Tf dµ.
Theorem 4.14. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 7 ). Then f is in the weak fine core of E if and only if f is in the private core of E s .
Proof. It is clear that if f is in the private core of E s , then f is in the weak fine core of E. Now, assume that f is in the weak fine core of E. Let P T be generated by the partition {A 1 , ..., A k } of Ω, and let X denote the set of all P T -measurable elements of (Y + )
Ω . Define a function γ : X → Y k + such that γ(f ) = f s , where f s = (f (ω 1 ), ..., f (ω k )) if ω j ∈ A j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Now for all t ∈ T , consider a function V s t : Y k + → R defined by V s t (f s ) = V t (γ −1 (f s )). Let E s be a symmetric information economy whose space of economic agents is (T, Σ, µ), and in which the consumption set of every agent is Y k + , the utility function and initial endowment of agent t are V s t and a s (t) = γ(a(t, ·)) respectively. Suppose that f is not in the private core of E s . Then f s is not in the private core of E s . Thusf s is is not in the private core of E s . Applying an argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4.10, one can show that there is a coalition R ⊆ Q∈P(T ) T Q blocking f s via h s such that P(R) = P(T ). Let E = R ∪ T 0 \ Q∈P(T0) T Q . Obviously, Let y(t, ·) = γ −1 (y s (t)) for all t ∈ E. Then, y(t, ·) is P E -measurable and V t (y(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ E. Moreover, E y(·, ω)dµ = E a(·, ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, f is also N Y -fine blocked by E via y. This contradicts with the fact that f is in the weak fine core of E. Consequently, f must be in the private core of E s .
Remark 4.15. A similar conclusion can be derived for atomless economies under (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ) only.
